Abstract-Internet of Things (IoT) is a ubiquitous network that devices are interconnected and users can access those devices through the Internet. Recently, medical healthcare systems are combined with these IoT networks and provide efficient and effective medical services to medical staff and patients. However, the security threats are increased simultaneously as the requirements of medical services in IoT medical environments are increased. It is essential to provide security of the networks from malicious attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of mobile devices and wireless networks, users can access various services conveniently at any time and anywhere [1] , [2] . These changes affect the healthcare environment, enabling medical devices to communicate with each other and communicate that information to the users. Those devices are also interconnected with medical servers and medical staff [3] . The changes that those developments have brought on to the daily lives of human beings are enormous. The spread of IoT medical technology enables people to utilize advanced medical services such as e-healthcare [4] , [5] . The telecare medical information system (TMIS) is one of the advanced information medical system [6] , [7] . Medical staff can treat patients and diagnose a case of them in the distance with the aid of medical devices and store the information of patients to a medical server. Remote monitoring can be possible efficiently with IoT connected medical devices. Sensors attached to patients can capture health data and share it through wireless connection with medical staff. The IoT technology in medical environments makes the healthcare system easy to be managed and gives a lot of possibilities of medical services.
However, the IoT environment has an enormous threat to security and privacy due to its heterogeneous and dynamic nature [8] . To make the IoT-based medical system widely accepted, security problems should be resolved in advance. Especially, user authentication is an essential prerequisite among all the security concerns to provide integrity, access control, and availability for IoT environments [9] - [11] . Without secure authentication methods, the external party can directly access user's information which are more valuable and even critical than general information. Hence, it is necessary to provide an authentication process between a user and service providers before permitting a user to access the services.
There are many authentication schemes to provide security of users medical information. To provide user security against inside attackers, Chen et al. proposed a dynamic ID-based authentication scheme for TMIS [12] . However, [12] was vulnerable to guessing attacks and tracking attacks. Jiang et al. [3] demonstrated that and [12] ' scheme leaked out personal information. Then Jiang et al. proposed an authentication scheme which can withstand anonymity and untraceability of users. But There scheme was attacked by Kumari et al. [6] . They said [3] was vulnerable to password guessing attack, user impersonation attack, and so on. [7] also showed the security flawless of [3] . Many authentication schemes try to provide patients to utilize medical services securely.
Roy et al. [13] proposed a three factor remote user authentication scheme in IoT medical environments. They insisted that their scheme is resist to various attacks. Unfortunately, this paper demonstrates Roy et al.'s scheme fails to provide security against a number of attacks, such as replay attacks and offline password guessing attacks. And we show that their scheme does not provide perfect forward secrecy. Subsequently, we propose a secure three factor remote user authentication scheme to solve these security vulnerabilities.
A. Threat model
The Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model [14] is widely used in evaluating the security of a protocol [15] . Under the DY model, we assume that the capabilities of adversaries A are as follows.
• A has total controlled over the communication channel connecting the users and the remote server in login/authentication phase. Thus the adversary can intercept, insert, delete, or modify any message transmitted via a public channel.
• A can have a lost or stolen smart card, and extract the information stored in a smart card by means of analyzing the power consumption of the smart card [16] , [17] .
• A can perform various attacks including offline password guessing attack, replay attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. Especially, A can guess identity and password simultaneously [18] .
B. Contributions
The contributions made in the paper are listed below:
1) We analyze security weaknesses of Roy et al.'s scheme [13] and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to replay attack, offline password guessing attack. In addition, we show that their scheme does not provide perfect forward secrecy. 2) To overcome these security weaknesses, we propose an enhanced secure authentication scheme in IoT medical network. The proposed scheme prevents various attacks such as password guessing attack, user impersonation attack and replay attack from malicious adversaries. 3) Our scheme provides secure mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy, and we prove the secure mutual authentication of our scheme using the BAN logic.
C. Paper Structure
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Roy et al.'s scheme followed by the cryptanalysis of Roy et al.'s scheme in Secion 3. In Section 4, we propose a secure remote user authentication scheme in IoT medical networks to withstand the security pitfalls found in the authentication scheme of Roy et al.'s scheme, and then security and efficiency of the proposed scheme are analyzed with related existing schemes in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF ROY ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we review Roy et al.'s remote user authentication scheme. It is composed of four phases: registration, login, authentication and key establishment, and password change. Table I describe the notations used throughout the paper. Reproduction function
encryption/decryption using key k X S master secret key of Sj T Si timestamp || concatenate operation XOR operation h(·) hash function
A. Registration phase
If a new user U i wants to access the medical service, U i must register with the remote server S j first. The Roy et al.'s user registration phase is illustrated in Figure 1 , and the detailed steps of this registration phase are as follows: 1) U i chooses ID i and P W i , and imprints a biometric template B i . U i generates parameters < α i , β i >← Gen(B i ).
2) U i generates a random number θ i and compute 
B. Login phase
When the authenticated user U i wants to use a medical service, U i sends request messages of accessing the medical service to the remote server S j . Roy et al.'s scheme also supposed that U i and S j must authenticate each other before sending the request message. The Roy et al.'s login phase is illustrated as follows:
1) U i chooses ID i and P W i , and imprints biometrics B i .
Then SC i generates α i , and computes θ i and Y 3 , and then compares Y 3 with Y 3 to check a user credential as follow:
2) SC i generates two random number RN i and θ * i and computes RP B i , µ i (= h(δ i )), T ID i , D 1 and H 1 as follows:
C. Authentication and key establishment phase U i and S j authenticate and generate a session key. Figure  2 illustrates the authentication and key establishment phase, which performs as follows: 1) S j computes δ i , µ i , and decrypts D 1 and obtain 
If both verifications are successful, proceed to the next step.
and H 2 as follows:
Then, S j sends the replay message M sg 2 =< D 2 , H 2 , T S j > to U i via a public channel. 4) U i retrieves T S * j and checks T S * j − T S j ≤ ∆T . If it is true, U i computes T ID 1 i , δ i and decrypts D 2 as follows:
. Then U i checks the validity of H 2 by comparing it with the computed value h(T ID 
D. Password change phase
To provide a password change requirement, U i performs following steps. 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF ROY ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we demonstrate that Roy et al.'s scheme cannot prevent replay attacks and offline password guessing attacks. We also show that their scheme cannot provide perfect forward secrecy, and an adversary can trace users freely. We assumed that an adversary A could steal or obtain the user's smart card SC i . In addition, an adversary A could extract information {Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 } from the smart card and could get previous session messages transmitted through public network. The description of the security weaknesses of Roy et al.'s scheme is as follows.
A. Reply attack
If the adversary A obtains the transmitted parameter T ID i , A can attempt to reuse it as it's registration message, and then A can get δ i used as a secret key between a user and a server. The procedure of replay attack is as follow.
1)
A captures the transmitted parameter T ID i and sends it to S j . 2) S j which received T ID i from A computes δ i = h(H(T ID i )||X S ) which is exactly same as that of U i . 3) S j sends δ i to A via a secure channel. 4) A computes a session key µ i = h(δ i ) and may use it to decrypt D 1 .
The result of this attack indicates that Roy et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to replay attack.
B. Offline password guessing attack
If the adversary A somehow steals SC i of U i , A can attempt to guess the password of U i , and then A can guess identity and password of U i successfully. The procedure of offline password guessing attack is as follows: 1) From the password dictionary space D P W , the adversary A randomly chooses the password P W * i , and picks up the identity ID * i from the identity dictionary space
To check the correctness of P W * i , A examines whether T ID * i = T ID i , where T ID i is previous transmitted parameter. If it is correct, A guesses identity and password of U i correctly.
Therefore, Roy et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack.
C. Lack of perfect forward secrecy
We assume that A intercepts and store messages transmitted in the previous session, and a session key µ i is compromised by A. In Roy et al.'s scheme, D 1 is computed as
Once µ i is revealed to A, A can decrypt the previous encrypted messages using µ i . Therefore, Roy et al.'s scheme does not support perfect forward secrecy.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME In this section, we present the secure biometric based remote user authentication scheme for IoT medical networks that overcomes the security weaknesses of Roy et al's scheme. To provide perfect forward secrecy, we refer Reddy et al.'s technique [19] . The proposed scheme consists of four phases as in the Roy's scheme, namely 1) Registration phase, 2) Login phase, 3) Authentication and key establishment phase, and 4) password change. It is worth noticing that the password change phase of the proposed scheme remains same as that of Roy et al.'s scheme.
A. Registration phase
If a new user U i wants to access the medical service, U i must register with the remote server S j first. User registration phase in the proposed scheme is illustrated in Figure 3 , and the detailed steps of this registration phase are as follows: 1) U i chooses ID i and P W i , and imprints a biometric template B i . U i generates parameters < α i , β i >← Gen(B i ).
2) U i generates a random number θ i and compute T ID
Then U i sends T ID i , RP W i to S j via a secure channel. 3) S j chooses two master key X S1 and X S2 . Then S j computes
Then S j sends a smart card SC i and δ i , B i , C i to U i via a secure channel. 4) U i computes the parameters Y 1 , Y 2 and Y 3 as follows:
B. Login phase
When the authenticated user U i wants to use a medical service, U i sends request messages of accessing the medical service to the remote server S j . The proposed scheme also supposed that U i and S j must authenticate each other before sending the request message. Login phase in the proposed scheme is illustrated as follows: 1) U i chooses ID i and P W i , and imprints biometrics B i .
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C. Authentication and key establishment phase U i and S j authenticate and generate a session key. Figure  4 illustrates the authentication and key establishment phase, which performs as follows: 1) S j computes δ i , r i , K i , and decrypts D 1 using K i and obtain (ID i , θ i , r i , T S i , RN i ) as follow:
2) S j retrieves T S * i and checks T S * i − T S 1 ≤ ∆T . If it is true, S j checks the validity of H 1 and T ID i using the decrypted parameters of D 1 as follows: T ID 
We analyse security and efficiency of the proposed authentication scheme. To prove the security of our proposed scheme, we perform the formal security analysis using the the BAN logic [20] . Furthermore, We perform the informal security analysis in order to verify the security of the proposed scheme is secure with high probability.
A. BAN logic security analysis
The notations of the BAN logic are given in Table II:   TABLE II. NOTATIONS OF THE BAN LOGIC Notation Description P | ≡ X P believes the statement X #X The statement X is fresh P X P sees the statement X P | ∼ X P once said X P ⇒ X P controls the statement X < X > Y Formula X is combined with the formula Y {X} K Formula X is encrypted by the key K P K ↔ Q P and Q communicate using K as the shared key SK Session key used in the current authentication session 1) Postulates of BAN logic: The postulates of the BAN logic are given below:
1.
Message meaning rule :
Nonce verification rule :
Jurisdiction rule :
4.
Freshness rule :
5.
Belief rule :
2) Goals: We have the following goals to demonstrate the secure mutual authentication of proposed protocol:
3) Idealized Forms: The idealized forms of the transmitted messages are given below:
We make the following initial assumptions to perform the BAN logic proof:
Step 5: According to the belief rule with S 3 and S 4 , we can get
Step 6:
Because of SK Ui,Sj = h(δ 1 i ||r i ||RN i ||RN j || T S i ||T S j ) from the S 5 and A 2 , we can get. where δ 1 i , RN j are random number selected by S j and T S j is current timestamp.
Step 7:
According the jurisdiction rule with S 6 and A 5 , we can obtain
Step 8: According to M sg 2 , we can obtain
Step 9:
In conformity with the message meaning rule with S 8 and A 4 , we can get
Step 10: According to the freshness rule with A 2 , we can get
Step 11: According to the nonce verification rule with S 9 and S 10 , we can obtain
Step 12: According to the belief rule with S 10 and S 11 , we can get
Step 13: According the jurisdiction rule with S 12 and A 6 , we can obtain
B. Security analysis against various attacks
Replay attack. Our scheme does not send a real identity ID i in public channels. A is required to know T ID i and θ i to derive ID i from P ID i , however, A cannot obtain both T ID i and θ i . Because r i is hidden to A and ID i , θ i is only known to an authentic user U i . Furthermore, P ID i changes in every session, therefore, A cannot reuse T ID i or P ID i to get any information from S j in registration phase as we have shown in chapter 3-A.
Resisting off-line Identity and password guessing attack. A may attempt to guess ID i from P ID i and Y 2 . Suppose A obtains these values and a smart card SC i . To find ID i from P ID i , A have to know r i and compute T ID i first, and then guess ID i and θ i concurrently, The guessing probability, when ID i consist of n characters and the hash value is 160 bits, is roughly 1/2 6n+160 and it is a computationally infeasible problem [21] . Therefore, it is infeasible to guess an identity correctly in our scheme.
Resisting off-line password guessing attack. A may attempt to guess P W i from Y 2 and Y 3 . The probability of guessing P W i from Y 2 and Y 3 is same as above.
A who somehow gets RP W i is also required to guess ID i , P W i and α i concurrently, and the probability is more complicated. Therefore, it is infeasible to guess a password correctly.
Forward secrecy and session key exposure. Three keys K i , λ i , and SK exist in the proposed scheme. Ephemeral key K i is computed as r i ⊕ h(C i ). Though A somehow knows K i , he/she cannot compute previous ephemeral keys K i , because r i changes in every session and is hidden to A. Likewise A somehow knows λ i , he/she cannot compute previous ephemeral keys, because r i changes in every session and is hidden to A. Session key contains random parameters {r i , RN i , RN j , T S i T S j }. Therefore, our scheme provides forward secrecy and withstands the session key exposure.
User anonymity. Our scheme does not send a real identity ID i in public channels. A is required to compute T ID i to derive ID i , however, A cannot even obtain T ID i because of r i is hidden. And T ID i changes dynamically into P ID i , thus A cannot trace U i using identity information. Therefore, our scheme provides user anonymity.
Resisting user impersonation attack. A who obtains a smart card SC i of U i and tries to access S j is needed to generate and send a valid login request message as a server, however, he/she cannot compute valid reply messages because A cannot get δ 1 i . Therefore, our scheme withstands the server impersonation attack.
Resisting man-in-the-middle attack. A who knows public channel information between U i and S j and has a smart card SC i can establish a secure channel when A knows unique information of U i , such as P ID i , C i , M i ....... However, as we mentioned above, A cannot compute those values because r i is hidden to A and guess ID i , P W i , and α i . Therefore, our proposal withstands the man-in-the-middle attack.
Resisting stolen smart card attack. A who somehow possesses a valid smart card SC i of U i may attempt to get authentication credentials. But, A cannot have any advantage because all the parameters are protected with a one-way has function. A also cannot obtain or compute any login information using SC i without ID i , P W i and α i . Guessing ID i and P W i concurrently is impractical as mentioned above. Therefore, our scheme withstands the stolen smart card attack.
We compare the functionality features of the proposed scheme with Roy et al.'s scheme in Table III. • indicates the scheme provides the property or is secure against the attack; × indicates the scheme does not provide the property or is vulnerable to the attack. 
C. Performance
We compare the cost of computation with Roy et al's scheme in Table IV . T h indicates the computation time for hash function; T F indicates fuzzy extraction; XOR are not considered because it can be ignored comparing with T h . The computation cost of ours is almost similar to [13] , and the proposed scheme enhances the security. [13] scheme User Server User Server
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Several biometric-based remote user authentication schemes using smart card have been proposed in the last few years. Unfortunately, most of them could not provide secure authentication and suffer from various attacks. This paper showed the security flaws of Roy et al.'s scheme. Roy et al's scheme is prone to replay attacks and offline guessing attacks. Furthermore, their scheme does not support perfect forward secrecy. We proposed a secure user authentication scheme in IoT medical environments for better security functionality than that of Roy et al. Our scheme withstands various attacks, such as replay and guessing attacks. In addition, our scheme provide perfect forward secrecy to provide secure authentication. In addition, the proposed scheme provides a dynamic identity mechanism and withstands various attacks by the malicious server.
